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Carry trades, in which an investor borrows a low interest rate currency and lends a high interest rate
currency, have been profitable historically. The risk exposure of carry traders might explain their high
returns, but conventional models of risk do not work because traditional risk factors, used to price
the stock market, do not price currency returns. Less traditional factors that are more successful in
explaining currency returns, are, however, unsuccessful in explaining the returns to the stock market.
More exotic models of "crisis risk" are another possibility, but I show that any time-variation in the
exposure of the carry trade to market risk has been insufficient, in sample, to explain the average returns









In a foreign exchange carry trade, an investor borrows funds in a low interest rate currency
and lends those funds in a high interest rate currency. The uncovered interest parity (UIP)
condition states that the interest rate di⁄erential between riskless assets denominated in
foreign and domestic currency is equal to the rate at which the foreign currency is expected
to depreciate against the domestic currency. If the UIP condition held, an investor engaged
in the carry trade would, therefore, expect a zero net payo⁄. One motivation for investors
to engage in the carry trade is, however, that UIP does not appear to hold in the data.1 If
anything, high interest rate currencies are more likely to appreciate than depreciate against
low interest rate currencies. Consequently, in historical data, carry trades have earned
positive average returns in excess of the interest di⁄erentials between the relevant currencies,
If investors expect to earn the interest di⁄erential, why do they limit their trading in
foreign exchange? The most obvious explanation is that carry trades are risky, and that the
average returns to carry trades re￿ ect a risk premium. In this paper, I review the evidence
for and against a variety of risk premium based explanations. I ￿rst explore traditional
factor models, ones that have been used to explain the returns to stock market portfolios.
Examples include the CAPM, the Fama-French three factor model and the consumption-
CAPM. I ￿nd that these traditional models fail to explain the returns to the carry trade,
de￿ned either as an equally weighted portfolio of carry trades (as in Burnside et al. (2006,
2011)) or as high-minus-low portfolio of carry trades (as in Lustig, Roussanov and Verdelhan
(2011)). Risk-based explanations of the returns to the carry trade rely on identifying risk
factors that covary with the returns. Traditional factors are either uncorrelated with carry
trade returns, i.e. they have zero betas, or the betas are much too small to rationalize the
magnitude of the returns to the carry trade.
I also examine less traditional factor models. These models adopt risk factors constructed
speci￿cally to price currency returns. I begin by studying the returns to portfolios of cur-
rencies that have been sorted according to the size of their forward discount. This sorting
approach to portfolio construction has a long tradition in the ￿nance literature (see Fama
and French (1993)), and was brought to the literature on currency returns by Lustig and
Verdelhan (2007). In studying a similar set of currency portfolios I ￿nd that three factor
models are quite successful in pricing the cross-section of returns. These models are based on
1See Hodrick (1987) and Engel (1996) for reviews of the large literature documenting the failure of UIP.
1Lustig, Roussanov and Verdelhan￿ s (2011) model, which uses a high-minus-low carry trade
factor, Menkho⁄ et al.￿ s (2010) model, which uses a global currency volatility factor, and
Ra⁄erty￿ s (2010) model, which uses a global currency skewness or ￿currency crash￿factor.
Although these models have some success in explaining currency returns, I ￿nd that they do
not explain stock returns. Given, as I argued above, that models that do reasonably well in
explaining stock returns do not explain currency returns, it appears that there is no unifying
risk based explanation of returns in these two markets.
One plausible explanation for the fact that one set of factors works for currency returns,
while another is more successful in explaining stock returns, is that there is some degree of
market segmentation. I ￿nd this explanation unattractive for the following reason. Although
segmentation between currency and stock markets is plausible, factors that price carry trade
portfolios ought to have some success in pricing other currency portfolios, such as those
based on momentum or value. Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2011), and Sarno et al.
(2011a) present evidence, however, that the same nontraditional factors that price carry
trade portfolios are unable to price momentum portfolios de￿ned using short-term historical
returns. Sarno et al. (2011a) report more mixed evidence for momentum de￿ned using
longer term historical performance. Sarno et al. (2011b) ￿nd that individual currency
characteristics appear to be important in explaining the returns to currency momentum.
Alternatively, it could be argued that empirical exercises involving currency returns reveal
one component of the global investor￿ s SDF, while those involving stock returns reveal a
di⁄erent component of it. I ￿nd this explanation unsatisfying because it e⁄ectively renders
untestable SDF-based explanations of asset return anomalies.
Finally, I provide evidence that time varying market risk is unlikely to explain the returns
to the carry trade. During the recent ￿nancial crisis, carry trade returns and stock market
returns became more highly correlated. This might suggest that covariance at times of
market distress explains the returns to the carry trade (see, for example, Lustig, Roussanov
and Verdelhan (2011)). While this is an interesting conjecture, as I show here the degree of
covariance seen in the data is insu¢ cient. An alternative explanation is the one pursued by
Burnside et al. (2011), who argue that periods of extreme risk aversion that have not been
observed in sample (peso events) can explain the returns to the carry trade and the stock
market. I argue, below, that important challenges for future research on peso event based
models is that they need to explain the empirical success of the nontraditional factor models
described above, the time variation in ￿risk premia￿needed to explain the UIP puzzle, and
2the cross-section of stock returns. Julliard and Ghosh (2010) suggest that explaining the
cross-section of returns is di¢ cult in a model with rare consumption disasters and constant
relative risk aversion preferences because rare disasters tend to reduce the cross-sectional
dispersion of the model-implied consumption betas.
In Section II I de￿ne the carry trade and measure the returns to two carry trade port-
folios in historical data. In Section III I derive theoretical pricing equations for risk-based
explanations and I outline the empirical methods used for assessing them. In Section IV
I present empirical results. In Section V I discuss time varying risk, rare events, and peso
problems. In Section VI I conclude.
II. The Carry Trade: Basic Facts
A. What is a Carry Trade?
In the carry trade, an investor borrows funds in a low-interest-rate currency and lends in
a high-interest-rate currency. Here, I let the domestic currency be the U.S. dollar (USD),
and denote the rate of interest on riskless USD denominated securities as it. I denote the
interest rate on riskless foreign denominated securities as i￿
t. Abstracting from transactions






￿ (1 + it); (1)
where St denotes the spot exchange rate expressed as USD per foreign currency unit (FCU).










￿ (1 + it)
￿
: (2)
The carry-trade strategy can also be implemented by selling the foreign currency forward
when it is at a forward premium (Ft ￿ St) and buying the foreign currency forward when it
is at a forward discount (Ft < St). If the number of FCUs transacted forward is normalized
to be (1 + it)=Ft, then the payo⁄ to this version of the strategy, denoted zt+1, is
zt+1 = sign(Ft ￿ St)
1 + it
Ft
(Ft ￿ St+1). (3)








3When CIP holds, the expressions for zt+1in equations (3) and (2) are equal to each other.
So the strategies are equivalent.
I measure payo⁄s to the carry trade using equation (3). My empirical analysis focuses
on the carry trade implemented at a one month horizon, so I mainly work with monthly
payo⁄s. In order to assess the importance of real risk factors that are measured at the
quarterly frequency, I also compute quarterly real excess returns to the carry trade. Letting
s be the time index for quarterly data, and t be the time index for monthly data, so that
s = t=3, the quarterly excess return in quarter s is de￿ned as:
z
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Rt = 1 + it￿1 + zt (6)
is the gross monthly rate of return to investing in the carry trade, and
R
f
t = 1 + it￿1 (7)





s=(1 + ￿s) (8)
where ￿s is the growth rate of the de￿ ator for the consumption of nondurables and services
from the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts.
B. Measuring the Returns to the Carry Trade
To measure the returns to the carry trade, I consider trades conducted on a currency by
currency basis against the U.S. dollar. I also consider portfolio based carry trade strategies. I
implement the trades with historical data using the forward market strategy described above.
My data set consists of spot and forward exchange rates from Reuters/WMR and Barclays,
available on Datastream, for the euro and the currencies of 20 countries: Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the U.K., and the U.S.
I use the risk free rate from Kenneth French￿ s database as a measure of the U.S. interest
rate.
The raw data are daily observations of spot and one-month forward exchange rates. I
use end of month values of these data to create monthly observations. The data span the
4period January 1976 to October 2010, with the sample varying by currency. Reuters/WMR
exchange rate quotes against the British pound (GBP) are available beginning in 1976.
Reuters/WMR exchange rate quotes against the USD are available from January 1997 to Oc-
tober 2010. I construct USD quotes over the longer sample by multiplying GBP/FCU quotes
by USD/GBP quotes. I augment the data set with USD quotes from Barclays for the Aus-
tralian, New Zealand and South African currencies from 1983 through 1996. Details of the
data set are provided in an online appendix available at http://web.duke.edu/~acb8/ctapp.pdf.
Table I provides summary information about the pro￿tability of carry trades between the
U.S. dollar and the other 20 currencies. On average the annual excess return to the individual
currency strategies is 4:6% with a typical standard deviation of 11:3% (on an annual basis)
and an annualized Sharpe ratio of 0:42. This compares favorably with the performance of
the U.S. stock market over the same period, which had an average excess return of 6:3%,
a standard deviation of 15:7% and a Sharpe ratio of 0:40. While the average carry trade
was pro￿table, the performance of the individual carry trade varies across currencies, with
trades against the Swiss franc earning a low 0:6% annual excess return, and trade against
the Danish krone earning a high 9:3% annual excess return.
When carry trades are combined in portfolios, their performance is more impressive still.
One strategy I consider is to combine all the individual currency positions in an equally
weighted portfolio with the total value of the bet normalized to 1 USD at the time it is
initiated. I refer to this strategy as the EW carry trade, and it is the same strategy studied
by Burnside et al. (2011). As Table I indicates, over the historical sample, the EW strategy
had an average annual payo⁄of 4:6%, with a standard deviation of 5:1% and a Sharpe ratio
of 0:90. This shows that there are large diversi￿cation gains to combining carry trades in a
portfolio.
A second strategy is constructed as follows. In each period, the available currencies in
my sample, including the USD, are sorted into ￿ve bins according to their forward discount
against the USD (of course, the USD￿ s forward discount is 0). The ￿rst bin includes those
currencies with the smallest forward discounts (the lowest interest rates), the second bin
the next smallest, etc., with the ￿fth bin consisting of those currencies with the largest
forward discounts (and, therefore, the highest interest rates). I then compute the payo⁄
associated with borrowing one dollar in order to invest equally in the riskless securities of
the constituent currencies of each bin.2 This is equivalent to calculating the average value of
2This is the same procedure used by Lustig, Roussanov and Verdelhan (2010) and Menkho⁄et al. (2010).
5(1 + it)(St+1 ￿ Ft)=Ft for the currencies with the bin. The USD is treated the same as other
currencies, with the payo⁄being zero. This procedure produces ￿ve currency portfolios that
I refer to as S1, S2, S3, S4 and S5. The second carry trade portfolio that I study involves
investing 1 USD in S5 and ￿1 USD in S1. This is, e⁄ectively, equivalent to executing a
carry trade in which the investor borrows the low interest rate currencies in S1 in order to
lend funds in the high interest rate currencies in S5. Like Lustig, Roussanov and Verdelhan
(2011), I refer to this portfolio as the HML carry trade portfolio.3 As Table I indicates, over
the historical sample, the HML carry trade strategy had an average annual excess return
of 6:0%, with a standard deviation of 9:5% and a Sharpe ratio of 0:63. Although the HML
portfolio had larger average returns than the EW portfolio over the historical sample, it is
important to note that it is more highly leveraged than the EW portfolio since it involves a
bet size of two dollars instead of one dollar.
Figure 1 shows 12-month moving averages of the carry trade portfolio and the U.S. stock
market excess returns. Two features of the returns are worth noting. First, the EW and
HML carry trade returns are positively correlated with each other (the correlation of the
raw monthly returns is 0:51) but not perfectly so. Second, neither carry trade portfolio is
strongly correlated with the US stock market, despite their common poor performance in
the 2008-09 ￿nancial crisis.
Currency movements are often characterized as being highly skewed. For example, Brun-
nermeier, Nagel and Pedersen (2008) note the saying among traders that ￿exchange rates
go up by the stairs and down by the elevator.￿While there is evidence that large forward
discounts are associated with realized negative skewness of carry trade returns (and large
premia with positive skewness), the amount of skewness exhibited by the EW and HML carry
trade portfolios is less than that exhibited by the U.S. stock market, and for the EW port-
folio it is not statistically signi￿cant (see Table I ). Currency payo⁄s display excess kurtosis,
with noticeable central peakedness, especially in the case of the EW portfolio.
3The HML portfolio is a close cousin of a market index, the Deutsche Bank G10 Currency Future Harvest
(DBCFH). The DBCFH index takes positions in up to six currencies from a list of ten. The index is formed
by taking equally-weighted long positions vis-￿-vis the USD in the three currencies with the highest interest
rates, and symmetric short positions vis-￿-vis the USD in the three currencies with the lowest interest rates.
The currency composition of the DBCFH portfolio is rebalanced quarterly, while the composition of my
HML portfolio is rebalanced monthly.
6III. Pricing the Returns to the Carry Trade
Risk-based explanations of the returns to the carry trade begin from the premise that there is
an SDF that prices these returns. In particular, since the carry trade is a zero net-investment
strategy, the payo⁄, zt, must satisfy:
Et (Mt+1zt+1) = 0. (9)
Here Mt+1 denotes the SDF that prices payo⁄s denominated in dollars, while Et is the
mathematical expectations operator given information available at time t. Equation (9)
implies that:




The variable pt is referred to as the conditional risk premium and corresponds to the condi-
tional expectation of the payo⁄. As equation (10) suggests, one approach to learning about
risk premia is to build a forecasting model for the payo⁄s to the carry trade. An approxima-
tion to the mathematical expectation in equation (10) is implicit in any forecasting model.
Therefore, model forecasts correspond to estimates of the risk premium (Fama (1984)).
Consider an example of an individual currency carry trade in which the domestic interest
rate exceeds the foreign interest rate, i.e., it > i￿
t, or, equivalently that the foreign currency
is at a forward premium: Ft > St. Assume that the carry trader sells S
￿1
t units, rather than





so that (10) becomes:




where ￿t+1 = (St+1 ￿ St)=St is the rate of appreciation of the foreign currency, and fpt =
(Ft ￿ St)=St is the forward premium.
Several features of equation (12) are worthy of note. First, to the extent that the exchange
rate is well-approximated by a martingale, the risk premium to a carry trade is simply equal
to the forward premium, i.e., if EtSt+1 = St then pt = fpt. Second, for many currency pairs
￿t+1 and fpt covary negatively in sample.4 This implies, given equation (12), that for these
currency pairs
var(pt) ￿ var(fpt) + var(Et￿t+1) (13)
4For early surveys see Hodrick (1987) and Engel (1996). For recent evidence, see Burnside et al. (2006).
Bekaert and Hodrick (1992) provide a broad set of evidence on the predictability of currency returns.
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cov(pt;Et￿t+1) ￿ ￿var(Et￿t+1): (14)
These inequalities, derived by Fama (1984) and discussed by Engel (1996), put restrictions
on the time series properties of the risk premium that could clearly be tested for a particular
model. Any good forecast based model, however, will satisfy (13) and (14) by construction.
To see this, let ^ ￿t+1 be the time series of one step ahead forecasts of ￿t+1 produced by a fore-
casting model, and let the estimated risk premium be ^ pt = fpt￿^ ￿t+1. As long as the forecasts
have the property that cov(^ ￿t+1;fpt) ￿ 0 it follows that var(^ pt) ￿ var(fpt) + var(^ ￿t+1) and
cov(^ pt;^ ￿t+1) ￿ ￿var(^ ￿t+1). Finally, the challenge posed to economic researchers by (12) is
that the risk premium is equal to the covariance term on the right hand side of the equation.
A risk based explanation of the returns to the carry trade, therefore, relies on identifying
an SDF that covaries with the rate of appreciation of the foreign currency. If in sample risk
explains the returns to the carry trade, then this SDF should correspond to some observable
time series. As I argue below, ￿nding such an SDF remains an elusive goal of economic
research.
My exploration of candidate SDFs focuses on the unconditional moment condition re-
striction corresponding to (9):
E (Mz) = 0. (15)
I consider SDFs that are linear in vectors of risk factors:
Mt = ￿
￿




Here ￿ is a scalar, ft is a k ￿ 1 vector of risk factors, ￿ = E(ft), and b is a k ￿ 1 vector of
parameters.
Since the parameter ￿ is not identi￿ed by (15) I set it equal to 1, so that E(M) = 1.
Given this assumption, equation (15) implies that:
E (z) = ￿cov(M;z): (17)
Given the model for M given in equation (16), equation (17) can be rewritten as
E (z) = cov(z;f)b (18)
or as
E (z) = cov(z;f)￿
￿1






8where ￿f is the covariance matrix of ft. Equation (19) is the beta representation of the
model. The betas, which are population coe¢ cients in a regression of zt on ft, measure the
risk exposure of the payo⁄, while ￿ is a k ￿1 vector of risk premia that is not speci￿c to the
payo⁄.
I assess risk based explanations of the returns to the carry trade in two ways. First, I ask
whether there are risk factors for which the payo⁄s to the carry trade have statistically and
economically signi￿cant betas. To answer this question, I run a simple time series regression
of each portfolio￿ s excess return on a vector of candidate risk factors:
zit = ai + f
0
t￿i + ￿it, t = 1;:::;T, for each i = 1;:::;n; (20)
where T is the sample size, and n is the number of portfolios being studied.
Second, I ask whether these betas, combined with estimates of ￿, can explain the returns
to the carry trade according to (19). One way to answer this question is to run a cross-
sectional regression of average portfolio excess returns on the estimated betas:
￿ zi = ^ ￿
0
i￿ + ￿i, i = 1;:::;n; (21)
where ￿ zi = 1
T
PT
t=1 zit, ^ ￿i is the OLS estimate of ￿i obtained above, and ￿i is a pricing error.
Let the OLS estimator of ￿ be ^ ￿ = (^ ￿
0^ ￿)￿1^ ￿
0
￿ z, where ￿ z is an n ￿ 1 vector formed from
the individual mean returns. Rather than actually running the cross-sectional regression
I estimate the parameters of the SDF using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM,










where z is an n￿1 vector of excess returns, and is equivalent to (18). The GMM estimators
of ￿ and b at each step are ^ ￿ = ￿ f and






where dT is the sample covariance matrix of z with f, and WT is a weighting matrix. Es-
timates of ￿ are obtained from ^ b as ^ ￿ = ^ ￿f^ b, where ^ ￿f is the sample covariance matrix of
f. The model￿ s predicted mean returns are dT^ b, and are estimates of the right hand side
of (18). The pricing errors are the residuals, ^ ￿ = ￿ z ￿ dT^ b. In the ￿rst GMM step the
weighting matrix is WT = In, and the estimate of ￿ and the pricing errors are the same as
9the ones obtained from the cross-sectional regression described above. In subsequent GMM
steps the weighting matrix is chosen optimally. A test of the pricing errors is obtained as
J = T ^ ￿
0V
￿1
T ^ ￿, where VT is a consistent estimate of the asymptotic covariance matrix of
p
T ^ ￿ and the inverse is generalized. The test statistic is asymptotically distributed as a ￿2
with n￿k degrees of freedom. I mainly focus on results obtained by iterating on the GMM
estimator to convergence. Burnside (2010a) shows that the ￿rst stage, second stage and
iterated GMM estimators have similar size properties when calibrated linear factor models
are used as the data generating process. However, the iterated estimator has much greater
power to reject misspeci￿ed models. Burnside (2007) provides further details of the GMM
procedure.
IV. Empirical Findings
In this section I use the empirical methods outlined in the previous section to determine
whether there is a candidate SDF that can price the returns to the carry trade. I begin by
studying risk factors that have traditionally been used to explain stock returns. These include
the CAPM, the Fama-French three factor model, models in which industrial production
growth and stock market volatility are used as risk factors, and consumption based models.
I show that none of the SDFs speci￿ed in terms of these traditional risk factors explains the
returns to the carry trade. I then turn to less traditional models in which the risk factors are,
themselves, derived from currency returns. These models have varying degrees of success in
pricing carry trade returns.
A. Traditional Risk Factors
A.1 Models for Monthly Returns
Table II summarizes the results of running the time series regressions described by equation
(20) for monthly models. Consider, ￿rst the CAPM model, which uses the market excess
return as a single factor. For the EW carry trade portfolio the beta is statistically insigni￿-
cant. It is also economically small. To see this, consider that in order for the CAPM model
to explain the return to holding the value weighted U.S. stock market, the annualized value
of ￿ must be approximately equal to the average excess return of the stock market, since the
beta of the market return is 1. Given that the beta of the EW carry trade portfolio is 0:028,
the CAPM model therefore predicts that the average excess return of the EW carry trade
10should be 0:028 times the average return on the market, or 0:2%, as opposed to the 4:6%
return indicated in Table I . For the HML carry trade portfolio the beta is larger (0:163),
and statistically signi￿cant, but it is still economically small. The CAPM model predicts
that the average excess return of the HML carry trade should be 0:163 times the average
return on the market or 1:0%, as opposed to the 6:0% return indicated in Table I .
The second model is the three factor model proposed by Fama and French (1993), which
uses the excess return to the value-weighted U.S. stock market (Mkt-Rf), the size premium
(SMB), and the value premium (HML) as risk factors. Here, the beta associated with
the Mkt-Rf factor is statistically signi￿cant for both carry trade portfolios but it remains
economically small. The beta associated with the SMB factor is small and statistically
insigni￿cant for both carry trade portfolios. The beta associated with the HML factor is
small and statistically insigni￿cant for the EW carry trade portfolio, but is statistically
signi￿cant and small for the HML carry trade portfolio.
The third model uses industrial production growth as a risk factor, while the fourth
model uses industrial production growth in conjunction with the Mkt-Rf factor. The betas
associated with industrial production growth are not statistically signi￿cant for either carry
trade portfolio.
The ￿fth model uses realized stock return volatility (measured monthly using daily obser-
vations of Mkt-Rf) as a risk factor, while the sixth model uses stock volatility in conjunction
with the Mkt-Rf factor. For the EW carry trade portfolio, the beta associated with stock
market volatility is not statistically signi￿cant in either model. For the HML carry trade
portfolio, the beta associated with stock market volatility is statistically signi￿cant, but not
when Mkt-Rf is included in the regression.
Table III presents results from estimating each of these models using the iterated GMM
estimator. The models are estimated using the EW and HML carry trade portfolios, as well
as Fama and French￿ s 25 portfolios sorted on the basis of book to market value and size.
First, it is worth noting that in every case the pricing errors of the carry trade portfolios are
statistically signi￿cant. None of the models explains the returns earned by these strategies.
Second, all of the models are rejected, at the 5% level, by the test of the pricing errors. The
only model with reasonably good ￿t is the Fama and French (1993) three factor model. For
this model two of the slope coe¢ cients (on Mkt-Rf and HML) are statistically signi￿cant,
while the third coe¢ cient (on SMB) is close to being signi￿cant. The R2 measure of ￿t for
the model is 0:38. But the model does a very poor job of explaining the returns to the carry
11trade portfolios.
A.2 Models for Quarterly Returns
Here I consider three risk factors: the growth rate of real consumption of nondurables and
services, the growth rate of the service ￿ ow from the real stock of durables, and the market
return. I consider each of these factors individually, but also use them together in a three
factor model following Yogo (2006), who used the three factor model to study stock market
returns. For the consumption variables I use both conventional timing (where consumption
growth and the returns are measured in the same quarter) and Campbell￿ s (2003) timing
where consumption growth is measured in the quarter after the returns are realized.
Table IV summarizes the results of running the time series regressions of quarterly real
excess returns on the risk factors described above. Consider, ￿rst the C-CAPM model, which
uses real consumption growth (nondurables plus services) as a single factor. This model
can be considered a linear approximation to a simple representative agent model in which
households have constant relative risk aversion preferences with risk aversion parameter b.
For both carry trade portfolios the beta is small and statistically insigni￿cant. The betas
are larger, but remain statistically insigni￿cant, when Campbell￿ s timing is used, and the
beta for the HML carry trade has counterintuitive sign.
Another model that has received broad attention in the literature, is a three factor model,
which I refer to as the Extended C-CAPM model, which includes consumption growth,
durables growth and the market return as risk factors. This model is a linear approximation
to a representative agent model in which households have recursive preferences over the two
types of consumption good. Yogo (2006) uses this model to explain stock returns, while
Lustig and Verdelhan (2007) use it to explain currency returns. Before turning to the full
three factor model, I study models that use durables growth and the market return as single
factors.
Consider, ￿rst, the model with the real growth rate of the stock of consumer durables
(interpreted as the growth rate of the service ￿ ow from durables) as a single factor. For
both carry trade portfolios the beta is statistically insigni￿cant, and it has counterintuitive
sign for the HML carry trade. The same is true for Campbell￿ s timing, largely because the
growth rate of the stock of durables is highly serially correlated.
Consider, next, the model that uses the market return, as opposed to the market excess
return used in the CAPM model, as a single factor. As we saw for the CAPM using monthly
12data, the beta is small and statistically insigni￿cant for the EW carry trade portfolio. For
the HML carry trade portfolio the beta is statistically signi￿cant, but economically small.
Finally, I enter all three factors together in a single model. None of the factors is statis-
tically signi￿cant for the EW carry trade portfolio, and neither consumption factor displays
any signi￿cance for the HML carry trade portfolio. The market return has signi￿cance for
the HML carry trade portfolio, but the coe¢ cient is quantitatively small. This evidence,
against a consumption-based explanation of the returns to the carry trade, is overwhelming.
Table V presents results from estimating the C-CAPM and extended C-CAPM models
using iterated GMM. The models are estimated using the real excess returns of the EW
and HML carry trade portfolios, as well as Fama and French￿ s 25 portfolios sorted on the
basis of book to market value and size. First, it is worth noting that none of the estimated
b parameters are statistically signi￿cant at the 5% level, though the ￿ associated with the
market return is statistically signi￿cant for the Extended C-CAPM model. Second, for all
cases, the pricing errors of the carry trade portfolios are statistically signi￿cant, the models
are rejected at the 5% level on the basis of the J-statistic, and the R2 measures of ￿t are
negative.
A.3 Discussion
The results in this section suggest that traditional risk factors cannot explain the returns to
carry trade portfolios. At best, the models considered here explain very little of the average
returns to the EW and HML carry trade portfolios, leaving unexplained economically large
and statistically signi￿cant pricing errors. In every case the models can also be rejected
based on statistical tests of the pricing errors.
The reader may be puzzled by the poor performance of the Extended C-CAPM model
given its prior apparent success in explaining stock returns (Yogo (2006)). The bottom line
is that the factors in the model simply do not produce the amount of spread in the betas
required for the model to be a success. It is not easy to illustrate the problem for a three
factor model, because there are betas in three dimensions and the partial explanatory power
of each factor is what is relevant. To deal with this issue, I construct a calibrated SDF,
^ mY
t = 1 ￿ (ft ￿ ￿ f)0^ bY where ^ bY is Yogo￿ s (2006) estimate of the b vector for the Extended
C-CAPM model, ft is the vector of relevant risk factors and ￿ f is their sample mean. I
then compute betas for the two carry trade portfolios and the 25 Fama-French portfolios
with respect to ^ mY
t . If the model explains the average returns on the 27 portfolios, then 27
13estimated betas and the 27 average returns should line up (with negative slope) in a scatter
plot. Instead, they are approximately uncorrelated in the cross-section (the correlation
coe¢ cient is ￿0:02). Also, only four out of the 27 betas are statistically signi￿cant at the 5
percent level. The model simply does not do a good job of explaining currency returns or
stock returns over the period 1976 to 2010.
B. Factors Derived from Currency Returns
I turn, now, to less traditional factor models. Here the factors are, themselves, derived from
currency returns. In creating factors in this way, the literature, beginning with Lustig, Rous-
sanov and Verdelhan (2011), takes inspiration from the literature on stock returns, where it
is common to choose risk factors that are, themselves, the returns to particular investment
strategies. For example, having identi￿ed the size and value premia, Fama and French (1993)
construct new risk factors which are the return di⁄erentials between, respectively, small and
large ￿rms (SMB), and high and low value ￿rms (HML). Similarly, many researchers have
used a momentum risk factor to explain stock returns, since Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)
identi￿ed the momentum anomaly.
B.1 Currencies Sorted by Forward Discount
The Fama and French factors and the momentum factors are created by sorting ￿rms on
characteristics. Take, for example, Fama and French￿ s SMB factor. To construct this factor,
Fama and French (1993) sort ￿rms by their market value. This sorting is done once per year
at the end of June. Firms in the bottom third in terms of size are used to form a portfolio
of small ￿rms. Firms in the top third in terms of size are used to form a portfolio of large
￿rms. The SMB factor is the return di⁄erential between the small ￿rm portfolio and the
large ￿rm portfolio in each period.
In a similar way, Lustig and Verdelhan (2007) and Lustig, Roussanov and Verdelhan
(2011) sort currencies into, respectively, eight and six portfolios according to their forward
discount against the U.S. dollar. The sorting is done period by period. Each portfolio is
equally weighted and represents the excess return to going long in the constituent currencies
while going short in the U.S. dollar. In Section II.B I constructed the S1￿ S5 portfolios in an
analogous way, and Menkho⁄ et al. (2010) follow a similar procedure. These ￿ve portfolios
are the focus of my empirical work in this section.
14Table VI shows the average returns of the ￿ve portfolios. Notice that they are monoton-
ically increasing going from S1 to S5. This establishes that sorting currencies on the basis of
the forward discount ￿works,￿in that it produces a set of portfolios with di⁄erent expected
returns, where the ordering of the expected returns aligns with an observed characteristic of
the underlying assets. This result should not come as a surprise. Meese and Rogo⁄ (1983)
established that it is hard to produce a currency forecasting model that beats a random
walk. If the change in the spot rate for each currency was exactly a random walk then the
expected excess returns of S1 through S5 would be exactly equal to the forward discount
period by period. In that circumstance, sorting done on the basis of the forward discount
could not fail to provide portfolios with ordered average returns.
B.2 Factors Created from Sorted Portfolios
Lustig, Roussanov and Verdelhan (2011) take the sorting approach one step further by con-
structing two risk factors that they then use to price the cross-section of their six portfolios.
The ￿rst risk factor, which they call the dollar risk factor, and denote RX, is simply the av-
erage excess return of the six portfolios. The second risk factor, which they denote HMLFX,
is the return di⁄erential between the sixth portfolio (the largest forward discount) and the
￿rst portfolio (the smallest forward discount). In an analogous way, I construct two risk
factors, one denoted DOL, which is simply the average excess return of the S1￿ S5 portfolios
described above, the other being the excess return to the HML carry trade portfolio. Like
Lustig, Roussanov and Verdelhan I use these two risk factors to study the cross-section of
returns of the S1￿ S5 portfolios.
B.3 A Currency Volatility Factor
Menkho⁄ et. al (2010) use a factor analogous to DOL, and a factor that measures global
currency volatility, to study portfolios similar to S1￿ S5. Their volatility factor is constructed
on a monthly basis and is the average intramonth realized volatility of the daily log changes
in the value of each currency (available in their sample) against the USD. In studying the
importance of volatility as a pricing factor, they take inspiration from an earlier literature
that suggests exposure to volatility helps explain stock returns (Ang et al. (2006), Da and
Schaumburg (2009)). To re-examine their evidence, I construct a volatility factor, VOL,
which is measured monthly, and is the average sample standard deviation of the daily log
changes in the values of the currencies in my sample against the USD.
15B.4 A Currency Skewness Factor
Ra⁄erty (2010) uses a factor analogous to DOL, and a factor that measures global currency
skewness, to study portfolios similar to S1￿ S5. He takes inspiration from the literature on
currency crashes and liquidity, for example, Brunnermeier, Nagel and Pedersen (2009). They
tell a story in which carry trades drive currency dynamics until liquidity dries up, traders
draw back their positions in tandem, and the currencies which are the targets of their trades
crash. Accordingly, one might expect that carry trades are risky because high interest rate
currencies are exposed, in tandem, to these crashes. To measure coordinated ￿crashing￿of
target currencies, Ra⁄erty constructs a global currency skewness factor. This factor sorts
currencies into two groups, one with positive forward discounts (equivalently, positive interest
di⁄erentials) and one with negative forward discounts. On a monthly basis he measures the
realized skewness of the currencies in the ￿rst group, and the negative of the skewness of the
currencies in the second group. The average, across available currencies, of these skewness
statistics is his global currency skewness factor. I construct a similar factor using my data
set and refer to it as SKW.
B.5 Betas of Currency Factors
Table VI summarizes the results of running time series regressions of the monthly excess
returns to S1, S2, S3, S4, S5, the EW carry trade portfolio and the HML carry trade
portfolio on three pairs of risk factors: DOL and the HML carry trade factor, DOL and
VOL, and DOL and SKW. Consistent with the literature, the factors are entered in pairs in
the time series regressions.
The DOL and HML Carry factors are highly correlated with the S1￿ S5 portfolio returns.
The betas on the DOL factor are all close to 1 in value, and statistically signi￿cant. The
betas of the HML Carry factor run from ￿0:48 for S1 and increase across the portfolios to a
high of 0:52 for S5, although the betas for S2, S3 and S4 are all close to zero. The R2 for the
￿ve regressions are all large as well. DOL and HML Carry also have positive and signi￿cant
betas for the EW carry trade portfolio. Of course, the HML carry portfolio has a beta of 1
with respect to itself.
Should we be surprised by these ￿ndings? Not really. Recall, from Table VI, that
sorting the portfolios on the basis of the forward discount produced a monotonic ordering
of the expected returns. In this circumstance, the DOL and HML carry factors will, by
16construction, create a pattern in the betas similar to what we see in Table VI.5 The reason
is simple: DOL is the simple average of the returns to S1 through S5. And HML is the
di⁄erence between the returns to S5 and S1. If the returns to S1 through S5 were mutually
uncorrelated and had common variance the construction of the factors would then imply
a beta of 1 for the DOL factor, and betas of ￿0:5, 0, 0, 0, and 0:5 for the HML factor.
The observed pattern in the betas is very similar to this, with the di⁄erence being that the
returns to S1 through S5 are not mutually uncorrelated and do not have exactly the same
variance. In fact, S1 through S5 have an interesting factor structure. As Lustig, Roussanov
and Verdelhan (2011) point out, the covariance structure of S1 through S5 implies that two
important factors drive most of the time series variation in the ￿ve portfolio returns. Let
the covariance matrix of the returns to S1￿ S5 be ￿z, and diagonalize ￿z as ￿z = P￿P ￿1,
where P is the matrix whose columns are the orthonormal eigenvectors of ￿z and ￿ has
the corresponding eigenvalues of ￿z on the diagonal and zeros elsewhere. Lustig, Roussanov
and Verdelhan￿ s point is that there are two large eigenvalues, with the others being much
smaller. The eigenvectors corresponding to the two largest eigenvalues are close to being
proportional to (1, 1, 1, 1, 1), and (￿0:5, 0, 0, 0, 0:5). Therefore, if linear combinations of
the returns are formed using these vectors, the two resulting ￿factors￿are highly correlated
with, respectively, DOL and HML.
Turning, now to the DOL and VOL factors, we see that using VOL as a factor, rather
than HML Carry, has very little impact on the betas with respect to DOL. The betas with
respect to VOL decrease monotonically as we go from S1 to S5 and are statistically signi￿cant
for the extreme portfolios, being positive for S1 and negative for S5. The betas with respect
to VOL are also negative and statistically signi￿cant for the EW Carry and HML Carry
portfolios. These ￿ndings indicate that when global currency volatility increases, the returns
to holding low interest rate currencies increase and the returns to holding high interest rate
currencies decrease. That is, low interest rate currencies provide a hedge against increased
volatility. The average value of the volatility factor in the sample is 0:6%, indicating that on
an annualized basis volatility averages about 0:6 ￿
p
365 = 11:5%. The standard deviation
of the volatility factor in the sample is 0:2%. The magnitude of the betas for S1 and S5
implies that if volatility went up by one standard deviation, the annualized return to S1
would be 5:5% higher than normal, while the annualized return to S5 would be 3:1% lower
than normal.
5Burnside (2010b) goes through the details of this ￿by construction￿result.
17Similarly, when we consider the DOL and SKW factors, we see that using SKW as a factor
has very little impact on the betas with respect to DOL. The betas with respect to SKW
increase (almost) monotonically as we go from S1 to S5 and are statistically signi￿cant for all
portfolios, except S3. The betas are negative for S1 and S2, and positive for S3 through S5,
as well as for the EW Carry and HML Carry portfolios. These ￿ndings indicate that during
episodes in which intramonth global currency skewness becomes more negative, the returns
to holding low interest rate currencies increase and the returns to holding high interest rate
currencies decrease. That is, low interest rate currencies provide a hedge against currency
crashes, and high interest rate currencies are the most exposed to them. The average value
of the skewness factor in the sample is ￿0:07, with a standard deviation of 0:26. The
magnitude of the betas for S1 and S5 implies that if skewness became more negative by one
standard deviation, the annualized return to S1 would be 4:1% higher than normal, while
the annualized return to S5 would be 4:0% lower than normal.
B.6 Cross-Sectional Analysis of Currency Factors
Table VII presents estimates of the SDF for the three currency factor models, obtained using
the ￿rst stage GMM estimator. This estimator is equivalent to running the cross-sectional
regression, (21). The results in Table VII use only portfolios S1 through S5 in the cross-
sectional analysis. Not surprisingly, given our discussion of the betas, each of the models
appears to do quite well in explaining the cross-section of returns. To see why, recall that in
each case the betas with respect to the DOL factor were similar across portfolios and close
to 1. This means that the betas of the DOL factor act like a constant in the cross-sectional
regression. The b and ￿ estimates associated with the DOL factor end up being statistically
insigni￿cant, in each case, because the betas associated with the other factor are centered
near zero, and the cross-sectional average of the mean returns of S1￿ S5 is also, statistically,
near zero. The b parameters and risk premia (￿) associated with the HML Carry, VOL
and SKW factors are statistically signi￿cant at the 5% level (except the b associated with
VOL, which is signi￿cant at the 10% level). Again, this is not too surprising, because we
saw, in Table VI, that the betas with respect to these factors tend to increase or decrease
monotonically across the ￿ve portfolios. Finally, for all models the cross-sectional R2 statistic
is large. The model that uses DOL and HML Carry ends up being rejected on the basis of
the pricing errors at the 5% level. This is because the model does a relatively poor job of
explaining the returns on the non-extreme and non-central portfolios. This is a typical, by-
18construction, result for factor models based on one-dimensional sorts, where the ￿rst factor
is the average of the portfolio returns, and the second factor is the di⁄erence between the
extremes (Burnside (2010b)).
Table VIII presents estimates of the SDF for the three currency factor models, obtained
using the iterated GMM estimator. Qualitatively and quantitatively, most of the results
in Table VII are robust to using the iterated estimator. Ra⁄erty￿ s (2010) skewness based
model has the best ￿t, and has no individually signi￿cant pricing errors, as before. The
R2 associated with Menkho⁄ et al.￿ s (2010) model falls considerably but the model is still
not rejected on the basis of the J-statistic despite there being three individually signi￿cant
pricing errors. The poorer ￿t in terms of R2 can be understood by the fact that the iterated
GMM estimator attempts to shrink the pricing error associated with S2 but at the cost
of increasing the pricing errors associated with S1 and S4. The GMM estimator tries to
do this because these pricing errors are correlated with each other. Lustig, Roussanov and
Verdelhan￿ s HML Carry based model, despite having a high R2, is statistically rejected, as
before. With the iterated GMM estimator the poor ￿t of the non-central and non-extreme
portfolios, S2 and S4 is highlighted by their statistical signi￿cance.
B.7 Discussion
Models with factors based on currency returns seem to do quite well at explaining the returns
to sorted portfolios of currencies. In the case of the DOL-HML Carry model we have seen
that this is not surprising, given that the sorting works (in that it produces an ordering
of average returns), and given that both factors are constructed from the portfolios being
priced. Indeed, it is somewhat dissatisfying to explain currency returns with the HML
Carry portfolio when, previously, we were trying to explain the returns of the HML Carry
portfolio. For the other currency based models there is no similar issue, but, at the same
time, the factors used in these cases are only indirectly linked to theoretical models. In a
sense, therefore, we are left with the unsettling question: Why do these models seem to work
in pricing the cross-section of S1￿ S5?
If the estimated currency based models are really informative about the SDFs of investors,
then these models should also price stock returns. To see whether they do I re-estimate the
models of the previous section using the ￿ve sorted portfolios, as well as Fama and French￿ s
25 portfolios sorted on the basis of size and value. When the stock market portfolios are
added to the cross-section, the models fare quite poorly. As Table IX shows, the estimated
19parameters of the models do not change dramatically. However, the ￿t of the models and the
results of the tests of the overidentifying restrictions suggest that the models simply cannot
explain the cross-section of stock returns.
This ￿nding suggests that the cross-sectional analysis does not identify investors￿SDF,
or, to put it di⁄erently, a simple risk-based story based on the moment condition (17) has
not yet been identi￿ed. However, the currency based models are informative. They tell us
that carry trade strategies (like EW Carry and HML Carry) do better when currencies are
less volatile and daily returns are less skewed. They do worse when volatility increases, and
skewness becomes more negative. This ￿nding is informative about the forces that drive
currency ￿ uctuations even if a satisfactory SDF has yet to be identi￿ed.
There are two less pessimistic interpretations of my ￿ndings. The ￿rst, is that there
is some degree of market segmentation, which would make one SDF applicable to stock
returns, and another relevant to currency returns. Although this is a logical possibility,
there is empirical evidence against it. The nontraditional risk factors, described above, that
do reasonably well at explaining currency portfolios sorted on the basis of forward discount,
ought to explain other currency portfolios, such as those based on momentum, if they are
re￿ ective of currency investors￿SDF. Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2011), and Sarno et
al. (2011a) present evidence, however, that the same nontraditional factors that price carry
trade portfolios are unable to price momentum portfolios de￿ned using short-term historical
returns (i.e., when momentum is de￿ned in terms of the previous month￿ s return). Sarno et
al. (2011a) report more mixed evidence for momentum de￿ned using longer term historical
performance. Sarno et al. (2011b) ￿nd that individual currency characteristics appear to be
important in explaining the returns to currency momentum.
The second interpretation of my ￿ndings is that empirical exercises involving currency
returns identify one component of the global investor￿ s SDF, while those involving stock
returns identify another. According to this interpretation, in e⁄ect, the fully successful SDF
is the sum of the individual SDFs identi￿ed by sorting stocks, currencies, and other assets,
on the basis of each asset return anomaly. Again, this is a logically coherent explanation,
but one I ￿nd rather unsatisfying in that it makes SDF-based explanations untestable.
20V. Time Varying Risk and Rare Events
I concluded, in Section IV.A, that standard risk models do not explain the returns to the
carry trade. There we saw that the beta of the HML carry trade portfolio with respect to
the CAPM factor is statistically signi￿cant, but is much too small (0:163) to explain the
risk premium of the carry trade. To explain the roughly 6% risk premium of the HML
Carry portfolio, the beta would need to be about six times as large. Lustig, Roussanov and
Verdelhan (2011) agree on this assessment, arguing that ￿the average beta of HMLFX with
the US stock market return is too small to explain carry trade risk premia.￿However, they
argue that the beta of the carry trade with respect to the stock market increases during
times of ￿nancial market distress. Certainly, during the recent mortgage crisis my HML
carry trade factor displayed more correlation than usual with the stock market. However,
it seems unlikely that a simple conditional beta story can explain the returns to the carry
trade. There are two reasons favoring this conclusion. First, as Figure 1 reveals, in historical
data, there is no systematic relationship between distress in the stock market (measured by
periods of sharp decline) and currency crashes (measured by period of big losses to the carry
trade). Second, time variation in the carry trade￿ s stock market beta, while signi￿cant, is
quantitatively not large enough. To see this, consider Figure 2, which plots betas of the daily
returns of the HML carry trade portfolio with respect to the market premium. The betas are
computed with a 130 working day (6-month) backward-looking rolling window, but similar
results emerge with di⁄erent windows. Overall the betas, even at the extremes, are not that
large. The ￿gure also shows all dates at which the monthly return to the stock market was
￿10% or less. If these months initiated periods of stock market distress we might expect to
see the rolling window betas increase in the 6-month windows inclusive of these events. In
some cases, as in the recent crisis, this is what we observe. In other cases, such as the stock
market crash at the end of the dot-com boom in 2000￿ 01, there is no such increase in the
beta.
Lustig, Roussanov and Verdelhan (2011) brie￿ y explore a potentially related explanation
of currency returns. They consider a two factor model in which one of the factors is DOL
and the other factor is a measure of the change in global stock market volatility (the cross-
country average of daily intramonth stock market volatility, measured using local currency
MSCI indices). They ￿nd that the betas of their sorted currency portfolios with respect to
stock market volatility decrease with the size of the interest di⁄erential. While the second
21factor is driven out by their HML carry factor in cross-sectional regressions, the relationship
between stock market volatility and currency returns may shed light on a common economic
explanation of the returns to the carry trade, especially because stock market volatility has
been shown to have some power to explain the cross-section of stock returns (Ang et al.,
2006).
An alternative explanation of the returns to the carry trade is that they re￿ ect out of
sample (or peso event) risk.6 This explanation relies on the notion that (17) still holds, but
that the observed historical data are not fully representative of the underlying population
distribution of the payo⁄s and the SDF. Burnside et al. (2011) use currency options data
to construct hedged and unhedged versions of the EW carry trade portfolio. By doing
so, and by imposing that (17) holds after allowing for peso event risk, they are able to
characterize the nature of the hidden peso events. They argue that peso events appear to
be ones in which carry trades incur relatively modest losses. The de￿ning characteristic of a
peso event, instead, is the fact that the SDF increases sharply, indicating that investors fear
disastrous outcomes.
What remains to be seen is whether the peso event based explanation of the returns to
the carry trade can be connected to the results discussed above. Can peso risk induce a time-
varying risk premium that explains the UIP puzzle? Can peso risk explain the correlation
between volatility and skewness factors and carry trade payo⁄s? These are open questions
for future research. A theme of this paper is that explanations of asset pricing puzzles that
work across markets are not easily identi￿able. So a peso risk story that works for currencies
should also work for stock returns. Burnside et al. (2011) suggest that the same peso event
that can rationalize carry trade returns can also rationalize the return on the overall stock
market. Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2011) suggest that the same peso event that
can rationalize carry trade returns can also rationalize currency momentum returns. Julliard
and Ghosh (2010), however, suggest that rare consumption disasters make the cross-section
of stock returns harder to rationalize, because they reduce the spread of consumption betas
in the cross-section. Also, if we observe su¢ ciently many extreme events in markets (e.g.,
the 2008 ￿nancial crisis, the 2011 European debt crises and the 2011 downgrade of U.S.
Treasury debt by Standard and Poor￿ s) the distinction between theories based on observed
6Krasker (1980), Lewis (1989) and Kaminsky (1993) explored the role of peso problems in explaining the
behavior of foreign exchange markets. More recently Burnside et al. (2010) ask whether out of sample events
can explain the returns to the carry trade. Farhi and Gabaix (2008) and Farhi et al. (2009) explore both in
sample and out of sample rare events.
22risk factors, especially those related to measures of volatility and skewness, and unobserved
peso events may become less clear. In other words, the in-sample frequency of extreme events
may end up being similar to their true frequency.
VI. Conclusion
Carry trades are, on average, pro￿table. As we have seen, conventional, stock market based,
models of risk do not explain the returns to the carry trade. Less traditional factors, that
are de￿ned in terms of the currency ￿ uctuations, are more successful in explaining currency
returns, but do not, conversely, explain the returns to the stock market. This means that, at
least for the moment, a unifying explanation of stock market and carry trade returns based
on observed ￿ uctuations in measures of risk remains elusive. An alternative explanation
is that carry trade returns re￿ ect investors￿concerns about out of sample events. While
this story has some appeal, it must, of course, grapple with the evidence that volatility and
skewness (or crash risk) factors have explanatory power in sample.
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25TABLE I: Annualized Excess Returns of Investment Strategies
Mean Standard Sharpe Skewness Excess
Deviation Ratio Kurtosis
Average of individual-currency 0.0460 0.113 0.418 -0.233 1.61
carry trades
Equally-weighted carry trade 0.0458 0.051 0.903 -0.531 4.23
(0.0095) (0.004) (0.212) (0.402) (1.52)
HML carry trade 0.0597 0.095 0.626 -0.516 1.63
(0.0164) (0.006) (0.192) (0.206) (0.77)
U.S. stock market 0.0634 0.157 0.403 -0.782 2.35
(0.0277) (0.010) (0.189) (0.278) (1.14)
February 1976 to October 2010. Statistics are reported for annualized excess returns. The U.S.
stock market return is the value-weighted excess return on all U.S. stocks reported in Kenneth
French￿ s database. The equally weighted carry trade portfolio is formed as the average of up to 20
individual currency carry trades against the U.S. dollar. The individual currencies are indicated
in the text. The HML carry trade strategy is a portfolio that takes an equally weighted long
position in the quintile of currencies with the largest forward discounts and an equally weighted
short position in the quintile of currencies with the smallest forward discounts against the U.S.
dollar. Heteroskedasticity consistent GMM standard errors are in parentheses. The mean excess
return of the equally-weighted carry trade is not equal to the average mean excess return of the
individual-currency carry trades because the sample periods for which the currencies are available
varies.
26TABLE II: Monthly Factor Betas of the Carry Trade Portfolios
EW Carry Trade HML Carry Trade
Factors Intercept Beta(s) R2 Intercept Beta(s) R2
CAPM 0.004 0.028 0.008 0.004 0.163￿ 0.072
(0.001) (0.017) (0.001) (0.038)
Fama-French factors 0.004 0.042￿ -0.034 0.037 0.020 0.003 0.185￿ 0.080 0.156￿ 0.100
(Mkt-Rf, SMB, HML) (0.001) (0.018) (0.029) (0.029) (0.001) (0.042) (0.047) (0.055)
Industrial production 0.004 0.118 0.003 0.005 0.171 0.002
(0.001) (0.146) (0.001) (0.231)
CAPM-IP 0.003 0.029 0.129 0.011 0.004 0.165￿ 0.232 0.075
(Mkt-Rf, I.P. growth) (0.001) (0.017) (0.141) (0.001) (0.038) (0.198)
Realized stock volatility 0.005 -0.002 0.005 0.014 -0.010￿ 0.038
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
CAPM-Stock vol 0.005 0.023 -0.001 0.009 0.009 0.138￿ -0.006 0.084
(Mkt-Rf, Stock vol) (0.002) (0.020) (0.002) (0.003) (0.036) (0.004)
February 1976 to October 2010. The table reports estimates of the equation zt = a+f0
t￿ +￿t+1, where zt is the monthly excess return of
a carry-trade portfolio and ft is a scalar or vector of risk factors. The CAPM factor is the excess return on the value-weighted US stock
market (Mkt-Rf), and the Fama-French factors are the Mkt-Rf, SMB and HML factors (available from Kenneth French￿ s database). The
industrial production factor is monthly industrial production growth. The stock volatility factor is realized daily volatility measured
monthly. Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are in parentheses. Slope coe¢ cients that are statistically signi￿cant at the 5
percent level are indicated by an asterisk (￿).
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7TABLE III: GMM Estimates of Monthly Linear Factor Models
b ￿ R2 J Pricing Errors (￿)
(%) EW Carry HML Carry
CAPM 2.18 0.45￿ -1.86 104 0.044￿ 0.051￿
(1.17) (0.22) (0.00) (0.009) (0.016)
Fama-French Factors
Mkt-Rf 3.36￿ 0.49￿ 0.38 91.0 0.043￿ 0.040￿





Industrial production -5.40 -0.03 -9.59 108 0.046￿ 0.060￿
(28.1) (0.14) (0.00) (0.009) (0.016)
CAPM-IP
Mkt-Rf 2.28 0.46￿ -1.76 103 0.044￿ 0.050￿
(1.21) (0.22) (0.00) (0.009) (0.016)
I.P. growth 4.64 0.02
(29.6) (0.14)
Stock volatility -0.30 -9.18 -3.49 85.77 0.044￿ 0.049￿
(0.25) (6.40) (0.00) (0.009) (0.017)
CAPM-Stock vol
Mkt-Rf -1.36 0.08 -6.70 80.5 0.044￿ 0.051￿
(1.70) (0.23) (0.00) (0.010) (0.018)
Stock volatility -0.41 -11.1
(0.33) (7.99)
February 1976 to October 2010. Test assets are the Fama-French 25 portfolios, and the EW
and HML carry trade portfolios. The CAPM factor is the excess return on the value-weighted
US stock market (Mkt-Rf), and the Fama-French factors are the Mkt-Rf, SMB and HML factors
(available from Kenneth French￿ s database). The industrial production factor is monthly industrial
production growth. The stock volatility factor is realized daily volatility measured monthly. The
table reports iterated GMM estimates of the SDF parameter, b, and the factor risk premia, ￿,
reported in monthly percent. The R2 is a measure of ￿t between the mean excess returns and the
predicted mean returns. Test statistics, J, for the overidentifying restrictions are also reported.
The annualized pricing errors of the carry-trade portfolios (￿) are reported. Heteroskedasticity
consistent standard errors are in parentheses, except for the J statistics, for which the p-value is
in parentheses. An asterisk (￿) indicates statistical signi￿cance at the 5 percent level.
28TABLE IV: Quarterly Factor Betas of the Carry Trade Portfolios
EW Carry Trade HML Carry Trade
Factors Intercept Beta(s) R2 Intercept Beta(s) R2
C-CAPM (￿c) 0.012 -0.021 0.000 0.016 0.018 0.000
(0.005) (0.744) (0.008) (1.234)
Durables (￿d) 0.007 0.524 0.009 0.018 -0.196 0.000
(0.007) (0.554) (0.010) (0.878)
Market return (Mkt) 0.012 0.009 0.001 0.013 0.145￿ 0.061
(0.002) (0.031) (0.011) (0.068)
Extended C-CAPM 0.007 -0.325 0.641 0.014 0.012 0.013 -0.437 0.130 0.148￿ 0.062
(￿c, ￿c, Mkt) (0.007) (0.828) (0.580) (0.032) (0.001) (1.184) (0.852) (0.069)
C-CAPM (￿c) 0.011 0.119 0.000 0.017 -0.384 0.001
(Campbell timing) (0.004) (0.605) (0.007) (1.170)
Durables (￿d) 0.007 0.495 0.008 0.016 -0.044 0.000
(Campbell timing) (0.007) (0.576) (0.011) (1.010)
Extended C-CAPM 0.007 -0.203 0.568 0.014 0.010 0.013 -1.646 0.604 0.172￿ 0.077
(Campbell timing) (0.007) (0.672) (0.618) (0.030) (0.011) (1.064) (1.021) (0.072)
1976Q2￿ 2009Q4. The table reports estimates of the equation z
qr
t = a + f0
t￿ + ￿t+1, where z
qr
t is the quarterly real excess return of
a carry-trade portfolio and ft is a scalar or vector of risk factors. The C-CAPM factor is the log growth rate of real consumption of
nondurables and services, the durables factor is the log growth rate of the service ￿ ow of durables assumed to be proportional to the real
stock of consumer durables, the market return factor (Mkt) is from Kenneth French￿ s database. ￿Campbell timing￿is explained in the
main text. Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are in parentheses. Slope coe¢ cients that are statistically signi￿cant at the 5
percent level are indicated by an asterisk (￿).
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9TABLE V: GMM Estimates of Quarterly Linear Factor Models
b ￿ R2 J Pricing Errors (￿)
(%) EW Carry HML Carry
C-CAPM 68.9 0.12 -7.25 66.2 0.047￿ 0.063￿
(50.2) (0.09) (0.00) (0.012) (0.021)
Extended C-CAPM
￿c 3.30 0.00 -1.25 65.6 0.046￿ 0.054￿





Models with Campbell￿ s timing for consumption
C-CAPM 31.1 0.06 -7.27 68.5 0.047￿ 0.064￿
(41.4) (0.07) (0.00) (0.011) (0.019)
Extended C-CAPM
￿c -17.1 0.01 -4.20 43.4 0.045￿ 0.057￿





1976Q2 to 2009Q4. Test assets are the Fama-French 25 portfolios, and the EW and HML carry
trade portfolios. The C-CAPM factor is the log growth rate of real consumption of nondurables
and services, the durables factor is the log growth rate of the service ￿ ow of durables assumed to be
proportional to the real stock of consumer durables, the market return factor (Mkt) is from Kenneth
French￿ s database. The table reports iterated GMM estimates of the SDF parameter, b, and the
factor risk premia, ￿, reported in quarterly percent. The R2 is a measure of ￿t between the mean
excess returns and the predicted mean returns. Test statistics, J, for the overidentifying restrictions
are also reported. The annualized pricing errors of the carry-trade portfolios (￿) are reported.
Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are in parentheses, except for the J statistics, for
which the p-value is in parentheses. An asterisk (￿) indicates statistical signi￿cance at the 5
percent level.
30TABLE VI: Factor Betas of the Sorted Currency Portfolios and the Carry Trade Portfolios
LRV (2010) Menkho⁄ et. al. (2009) Ra⁄erty (2010)
Portfolio Mean Return DOL HML Carry R2 DOL VOL R2 DOL SKW R2
S1 -0.80% 0.959￿ -0.478￿ 0.923 0.942￿ 0.0216￿ 0.736 0.948￿ -0.0129￿ 0.723
(1.86) (0.020) (0.020) (0.039) (0.0056) (0.043) (0.0030)
S2 -0.28% 0.901￿ -0.116￿ 0.857 0.893￿ -0.0000 0.841 0.904￿ -0.0066￿ 0.846
(1.69) (0.028) (0.021) (0.030) (0.0046) (0.028) (0.0021)
S3 2.80% 0.917￿ -0.001 0.825 0.915￿ -0.0030 0.826 0.910￿ 0.0044 0.827
(1.80) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.0033) (0.027) (0.0024)
S4 3.72% 0.959￿ 0.068￿ 0.868 0.961￿ -0.0044 0.864 0.957￿ 0.0041￿ 0.865
(1.76) (0.024) (0.022) (0.025) (0.0027) (0.025) (0.0021)
S5 5.17% 0.959￿ 0.522￿ 0.933 0.986￿ -0.0120￿ 0.717 0.973￿ 0.0126￿ 0.722
(2.13) (0.020) (0.020) (0.034) (0.0052) (0.036) (0.0031)
EW Carry 4.58% 0.184￿ 0.264￿ 0.371 0.196￿ -0.0080￿ 0.140 0.179￿ 0.0140￿ 0.187
(0.95) (0.040) (0.029) (0.045) (0.0039) (0.043) (0.0029)
HML Carry 5.97% 0 1￿ 1 0.044 -0.0336￿ 0.071 0.026 0.0255￿ 0.061
(1.64) (0.062) (0.0094) (0.069) (0.0052)
February 1976 to October 2010. The table reports estimates of the equation zt = a + f0
t￿ + ￿t+1, where zt is the monthly excess return
of each of the portfolios indicated and ft is a 2 ￿ 1 vector of the indicated risk factors. The DOL factor is the average excess return to
portfolios S1￿ S5. The HML carry portfolio is the excess return to being long portfolio P5 and short portfolio P1. The VOL factor is
a measure of realized global currency volatility. The SKW factor is a measure of realized global currency skewness. Heteroskedasticity
consistent standard errors are in parentheses. Slope coe¢ cients that are statistically signi￿cant at the 5 percent level are indicated by
an asterisk (￿).
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1TABLE VII: First Stage GMM Estimates of Linear Factor Models for Sorted Currency
Portfolios
b ￿ R2 J Pricing Errors (￿)
(%) S1 S2 S3 S4 S5
Lustig, Roussanov and Verdelhan (2010) factors
DOL 2.39 0.190 0.84 9.23 0.0010 -0.0158￿ 0.0071 0.0109 -0.0040
(2.05) (0.127) (0.026) (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0068) (0.0064) (0.0046)
HML Carry 6.97￿ 0.539￿
(2.08) (0.133)
Menkho⁄ et. al. (2009) factors
DOL 0.96 0.198 0.73 4.31 0.0060 -0.0240￿ 0.0012 0.0070 0.0081




DOL -2.11 0.182 0.96 1.51 0.0033 -0.0061 -0.0029 0.0061 -0.0008
(2.76) (0.131) (0.68) (0.0054) (0.0066) (0.0091) (0.0074) (0.0071)
SKW 3.05￿ 20.7￿
(0.95) (6.19)
February 1976 to October 2010. Test assets are the sorted currency portfolios S1￿ S5. The DOL
factor is the average excess return to portfolios S1￿ S5. The HML carry portfolio is the excess
return to being long portfolio P5 and short portfolio P1. The VOL factor is a measure of realized
global currency volatility. The SKW factor is a measure of realized global currency skewness. The
table reports ￿rst stage GMM estimates of the SDF parameter, b, and the factor risk premia, ￿,
reported in monthly percent. The R2 is a measure of ￿t between the mean excess returns and the
predicted mean returns. Test statistics, J, for the overidentifying restrictions are also reported. The
annualized pricing errors of the S1￿ S5 portfolios (￿) are reported. Heteroskedasticity consistent
standard errors are in parentheses, except for the J statistics, for which the p-value is in parentheses.
An asterisk (￿) indicates statistical signi￿cance at the 5 percent level.
32TABLE VIII: Iterated GMM Estimates of Linear Factor Models for Sorted Currency
Portfolios
b ￿ R2 J Pricing Errors (￿)
(%) S1 S2 S3 S4 S5
Lustig, Roussanov and Verdelhan (2010) factors
DOL 2.35 0.184 0.83 9.37 -0.0012 -0.0159￿ 0.0077 0.0120￿ -0.0001
(2.03) (0.127) (0.025) (0.0051) (0.0060) (0.0079) (0.0059) (0.0043)
HML Carry 6.30￿ 0.488￿
(2.03) (0.133)
Menkho⁄ et. al. (2009) factors
DOL -0.68 0.053 0.184 5.78 0.0127￿ -0.0085￿ 0.0185 0.0257￿ 0.0306




DOL -1.66 0.221 0.93 1.47 -0.0001 -0.0098 -0.0075 0.0012 -0.0064
(2.72) (0.136) (0.69) (0.0052) (0.0091) (0.0114) (0.0069) (0.0087)
SKW 3.14￿ 21.4￿
(0.94) (6.11)
February 1976 to October 2010. Test assets are the sorted currency portfolios S1￿ S5. The DOL
factor is the average excess return to portfolios S1￿ S5. The HML carry portfolio is the excess
return to being long portfolio P5 and short portfolio P1. The VOL factor is a measure of realized
global currency volatility. The SKW factor is a measure of realized global currency skewness. The
table reports iterated GMM estimates of the SDF parameter, b, and the factor risk premia, ￿,
reported in monthly percent. The R2 is a measure of ￿t between the mean excess returns and the
predicted mean returns. Test statistics, J, for the overidentifying restrictions are also reported. The
annualized pricing errors of the S1￿ S5 portfolios (￿) are reported. Heteroskedasticity consistent
standard errors are in parentheses, except for the J statistics, for which the p-value is in parentheses.
An asterisk (￿) indicates statistical signi￿cance at the 5 percent level.
33TABLE IX: GMM Estimates of Linear Factor Models for Sorted Currency and Stock
Market Portfolios
b ￿ R2 J
(%)
Lustig, Roussanov and Verdelhan (2010) factors
DOL 1.82 0.145 -1.92 97.0
(1.97) (0.128) (0.000)
HML Carry 5.26￿ 0.407￿
(1.94) (0.134)
Menkho⁄ et. al. (2009) factors









February 1976 to October 2010. Test assets are the sorted currency portfolios S1￿ S5 and the
Fama-French 25 portfolios sorted on size and value. The DOL factor is the average excess return
to portfolios S1￿ S5. The HML carry portfolio is the excess return to being long portfolio P5 and
short portfolio P1. The VOL factor is a measure of realized global currency volatility. The SKW
factor is a measure of realized global currency skewness. The table reports iterated GMM estimates
of the SDF parameter, b, and the factor risk premia, ￿, reported in monthly percent. The R2 is a
measure of ￿t between the mean excess returns and the predicted mean returns. Test statistics, J,
for the overidentifying restrictions are also reported. Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors
are in parentheses, except for the J statistics, for which the p-value is in parentheses. An asterisk
(￿) indicates statistical signi￿cance at the 5 percent level.
34FIGURE 1
Annual Realized Excess Returns of the Carry-Trade and U.S. Stock Market





(a) EW Carry Trade Portfolio
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(b) HML Carry Trade Portfolio
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(c) US Market Excess Return
%
12-Month rolling window, February 1976￿ October 2010. The carry trade portfolios are described
in detail the text. The EW carry trade is an equally weighted portfolio of carry trades in up to 20
currencies against the USD. The HML.carry trade portfolio is one in which the investor goes long
in the highest interest rate currencies and short in the lowest interest rate currencies, de￿ned in
terms of sorted quintiles of up to 20 currencies. The US market excess return is the Mkt-Rf factor
from Kenneth French￿ s database.
35FIGURE 2
The Time-Varying Market Beta of the HML Carry Trade Portfolio

















































6-Month rolling window, January 1977￿ June 2010. The beta is computed by regressing daily returns to the HML carry trade portfolio
on daily returns to the U.S. stock market, de￿ned as the Mkt-Rf factor from Kenneth French￿ s database. The green dots mark single
months in which the market excess return was less than ￿10%. The green lines delineate a 6-month window after but inclusive of each
of these dates.
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